Volume 8, Issue 5, September 2020, Page: 104-109
Reconsidering What Technologies Are Doing to Us
Taye Birhanu, Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Mettu University, Mettu, Ethiopia
Received: Aug. 12, 2020;       Accepted: Aug. 24, 2020;       Published: Sep. 8, 2020
DOI: 10.11648/j.ijsts.20200805.11      View  68      Downloads  77
Abstract
The paper exposes the non-neutrality of modern technologies in general and communication and information technologies in particular by focusing on the biases and discriminations that are built-in or embedded in the designs and operation systems of technological artefacts of now a days. The central argument of this paper is that modern technologies are shaping and controlling our life on daily basis often unknown to us, though they appear neutral objects at first glance. The current controversial status of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and human thinking is another main theme of the paper in which it is clearly and strongly argued that it is not worth living to delegate the works of our mind to AI or thinking machines, though there is a tendency of co-acting and sharing the most important distinctive feature/character (creative thinking) of human beings among thinking machines and human beings. Here, arises the need for democratizing and transforming the mainstream of design, operation and decision making in the realm of modern technologies, which in turn requires a thorough critical evaluation and philosophical enquiry into the design and operation of modern technological artefacts.
Keywords
Design, Technologists, Technological Artefacts, Non-neutrality, Artificial Intelligence (AI)
To cite this article
Taye Birhanu, Reconsidering What Technologies Are Doing to Us, International Journal of Science, Technology and Society. Vol. 8, No. 5, 2020, pp. 104-109. doi: 10.11648/j.ijsts.20200805.11
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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